

Roberto Rozzi

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References

Pietro Dindo	Ennio Bilancini	Heinrich Nax
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Research Interests and Methods

Evolutionary Game Theory; Behavioral Economics; Experimental Economics; Stochastic Stability; Signaling Games; Field Experiments

Positions

Postdoctoral Researcher at University of Siena	Jan 2024 – Present
Postdoctoral Researcher at University of Padova	Dec 2022 – Dec 2023

Education

Ca' Foscari University of Venice Venice, Italy Ph.D. Student (with fellowship) <i>Advisors: Pietro Dindo, Ennio Bilancini</i>	Sep 2018 – May 2023
IMT school for advanced studies Lucca, Italy Visiting Ph.D. Student <i>Contact: Ennio Bilancini</i>	Sep 2021 – June 2022
University of Modena and Reggio Emilia Modena, Italy Master Degree in Economics and Public Policy, 110/110 cum laude <i>Advisor: Ennio Bilancini</i>	Sep 2015 – Dec 2017

Research

Publications

“Competing Conventions with Costly Information Acquisition”. *Games*. 2021; 12(3):53.

[Link to journal website]

Research Papers

“Masks, cameras and social pressure”

Joint with Itzhak Rasooly

[Link to working paper]

In contrast to classical social norm experiments, we conduct experiments that *semi-continuously* randomise the share of individuals who are taking a particular action in a given environment. Using our experimental results, we are able to estimate the distributions of individual tipping points across our settings. We find that tipping points are very heterogenous, and that a substantial share choose to do the action (or not) regardless of what others are doing. We also show that, once embedded in dynamic models, our estimates predict that individuals will end up doing very different things despite engaging in copying-like behaviour.

“Does homophily impede human capital investments?”

Joint with Ennio Bilancini and Leonardo Boncinelli

[Link to working paper]

We consider a game where one candidate and one decision-maker are randomly matched from two equally sized populations. Nature assigns each candidate to one type. Candidates choose to invest or not in their skills and their social group. The decision-maker observes the candidate's social group but incurs a cost to observe his type and skill. Her main goal is correctly assigning the candidate to one task according to his type and skill. All candidates prefer the same task. They prefer to form social groups with candidates of their type if there is homophily and with any candidate if there is not. Our key finding is that under homophily, social groups are informative about candidates' skills and types in equilibrium, and therefore, the decision-maker never pays to know them. Consequently, candidates never have the incentive to invest in their skills. We compare homophily to the benchmark case and deliver welfare implications.

Work in progress

“The rise of conformism in the Hawk-Dove game”

I consider a double selection mechanism to study the evolution of conformists (the less intelligent type) and myopic best repliers (the more intelligent type) in the Hawk-Dove game. Myopic best repliers pay a cognitive cost for being the more intelligent type. At the largest time scale, I study the evolution of types between each generation based on their fitness at the equilibrium play occurring within each generation. I compute how the equilibrium play occurs in each generation using stochastic stability. The process goes on until both systems reach stability. My results highlight three main findings. First, conformists outnumber myopic best repliers in the evolutionary stable state. Second,

the fraction of hawks is always different than the one predicted by standard models. Third, conformists may play hawk or dove both when the conflict is harsh and when it is mild.

“Vertical product differentiation when consumers have costs for consideration”

Joint with Stefanie Y. Schmitt

Conferences, workshops and seminars

2023

ASSET meeting 2023, Catolica Lisbon Business and Economics; Seminar at University of Verona; XVII Grass workshop, University of Firenze; 38th meeting of the European Economic Association, Barcelona School of Economics; CEPET Workshop 2023, University of Udine; Conference on Economic Design 2023, University of Girona; M-BEPS, University of Maastricht; Oligo workshop 2023, University of Padova; The Lisbon Meetings in Game Theory and Applications, Lisbon School of Economics & Management; Seminar at University of Groningen (8th Ca' Foscari - University of Groningen PhD Exchange Seminar Series in Economics); Workshop "Southern Europe Experimental Team's Meeting", University of Valencia; 9th BEEN workshop, Ca' Foscari University of Venice.

2022

VPDE 15th PhD Workshop in Economics, University of Turin and Collegio Carlo Alberto; Seminar at University of Parma; Internal seminar at Ca' Foscari University of Venice; SASCA PhD Conference, Ca' Foscari University of Venice; ESA meeting, University of Bologna; ASFEE workshop 2022, University of Lyon; OLIGO2022, University of Cyprus (Nicosia); SING 17 (online); Conference on Economic Design, University of Padova; CEPET Workshop 2022, University of Udine.

2021

XV GRASS Workshop, Università Cattolica (Milan); 2021 Ceel Workshop on Decision Making, University of Trento; Internal seminar at Ca' Foscari University of Venice; Oligo2021 (online); SING16 (online); 62 Annual Conference of Italian Economic Association (online).

2020

Internal seminar at Ca' Foscari University of Venice.

Organized events/seminars

Internal seminars at Ca' Foscari University of Venice

September 2022 – December 2022

SASCA PhD Conference (organizing and scientific committee)

September 2021

Teaching Experience

Industrial Organization and Antitrust (undergraduate), University of Padova

November 2023

T.A. for Principle of Economics (undergraduate), University of Padova	November 2023
T.A. for Principle of Economics (undergraduate), Ca' Foscari University of Venice	Spring 2022
T.A. for Optimization (PhD/Master), Ca' Foscari University of Venice	Fall 2020
T.A. for Mathematics (undergraduate), Ca' Foscari University of Venice	Fall 2020
T.A. for Microeconomics (undergraduate), Ca' Foscari University of Venice	Spring 2020
T.A. for Public economics (undergraduate), Ca' Foscari University of Venice	Spring 2020
T.A. for Microeconomics (undergraduate), University of Modena and Reggio Emilia	Spring 2017

Languages

Italian (native), English (proficient), French (basic)

IT skills

NetLogo (Excellent), LATEX (Excellent), Stata (intermediate), Python (basic), R (basic)