Publications
Competing Conventions with Costly Information Acquisition. Games. 2021; 12(3):53.
We consider an evolutionary model of social coordination in a 2 × 2 game where two groups of players prefer to coordinate on different actions. Players can pay a cost to learn their opponent’s group: if they pay it, they can condition their actions concerning the groups. We assess the stability of outcomes in the long run using stochastic stability analysis. We find that three elements matter for the equilibrium selection: the group size, the strength of preferences, and the information’s cost. If the cost is too high, players never learn the group of their opponents in the long run. If one group is stronger in preferences for its favorite action than the other, or its size is sufficiently large compared to the other group, every player plays that group’s favorite action. If both groups are strong enough in preferences, or if none of the groups’ sizes is large enough, players play their favorite actions and miscoordinate in inter-group interactions. Lower levels of the cost favor coordination. Indeed, when the cost is low, in inside-group interactions, players always coordinate on their favorite action, while in inter-group interactions, they coordinate on the favorite action of the group that is stronger in preferences or large enough.
Research Papers
Masks, cameras and social pressure (with Itzhak Rasooly); Second R&R Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization
In contrast to classical social norm experiments, we conduct experiments that semi-continuously randomise the share of individuals who are taking a particular action in a given environment. Using our experimental results, we are able to estimate the distributions of individual tipping points across our settings. We find that tipping points are very heterogenous, and that a substantial share choose to do the action (or not) regardless of what others are doing. We also show that, once embedded in dynamic models, our estimates predict that individuals will end up doing very different things despite engaging in copying-like behaviour.
Does homophily impede human capital investment? (with Ennio Bilancini and Leonardo Boncinelli); R&R Journal of Economic Theory
We consider a game where one candidate and one decision-maker are randomly matched from two equally sized populations. Nature assigns each candidate to one of two types: they can invest or not in their skill and choose their social group. The decision-maker observes the candidate's social group, but she has to pay to observe his type and skill. Her main goal is correctly assigning the candidate to one of four tasks. All candidates prefer the same task. They prefer to form social groups with candidates of their type if there is homophily and with any candidate if there is not. Our key finding is that under homophily, social groups are informative about candidates' skills and types in equilibrium, and therefore, the decision-maker never pays to know them. Consequently, candidates never have the incentive to invest in their skills. We compare homophily to the benchmark case and deliver welfare implications.
The rise of conformism in the Hawk-Dove game
I consider a double selection mechanism to study the evolution of conformists (the less intelligent type) and myopic best repliers (the more intelligent type) in the Hawk-Dove game. Myopic best repliers pay a cognitive cost for being the more intelligent type. At the largest time scale, I study the evolution of types between each generation based on their fitness at the equilibrium play occurring within each generation. I compute how the equilibrium play occurs in each generation using evolutionary stability. The process goes on until both systems reach stability. My results highlight three main findings. First, conformists outnumber myopic best repliers in the evolutionary stable state. Second, the fraction of hawks is always different than the one predicted by standard models. Third, conformists may play hawk or dove both when the conflict is harsh and when it is mild.
Competing Conventions with Costly Information Acquisition. Games. 2021; 12(3):53.
We consider an evolutionary model of social coordination in a 2 × 2 game where two groups of players prefer to coordinate on different actions. Players can pay a cost to learn their opponent’s group: if they pay it, they can condition their actions concerning the groups. We assess the stability of outcomes in the long run using stochastic stability analysis. We find that three elements matter for the equilibrium selection: the group size, the strength of preferences, and the information’s cost. If the cost is too high, players never learn the group of their opponents in the long run. If one group is stronger in preferences for its favorite action than the other, or its size is sufficiently large compared to the other group, every player plays that group’s favorite action. If both groups are strong enough in preferences, or if none of the groups’ sizes is large enough, players play their favorite actions and miscoordinate in inter-group interactions. Lower levels of the cost favor coordination. Indeed, when the cost is low, in inside-group interactions, players always coordinate on their favorite action, while in inter-group interactions, they coordinate on the favorite action of the group that is stronger in preferences or large enough.
Research Papers
Masks, cameras and social pressure (with Itzhak Rasooly); Second R&R Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization
In contrast to classical social norm experiments, we conduct experiments that semi-continuously randomise the share of individuals who are taking a particular action in a given environment. Using our experimental results, we are able to estimate the distributions of individual tipping points across our settings. We find that tipping points are very heterogenous, and that a substantial share choose to do the action (or not) regardless of what others are doing. We also show that, once embedded in dynamic models, our estimates predict that individuals will end up doing very different things despite engaging in copying-like behaviour.
Does homophily impede human capital investment? (with Ennio Bilancini and Leonardo Boncinelli); R&R Journal of Economic Theory
We consider a game where one candidate and one decision-maker are randomly matched from two equally sized populations. Nature assigns each candidate to one of two types: they can invest or not in their skill and choose their social group. The decision-maker observes the candidate's social group, but she has to pay to observe his type and skill. Her main goal is correctly assigning the candidate to one of four tasks. All candidates prefer the same task. They prefer to form social groups with candidates of their type if there is homophily and with any candidate if there is not. Our key finding is that under homophily, social groups are informative about candidates' skills and types in equilibrium, and therefore, the decision-maker never pays to know them. Consequently, candidates never have the incentive to invest in their skills. We compare homophily to the benchmark case and deliver welfare implications.
The rise of conformism in the Hawk-Dove game
I consider a double selection mechanism to study the evolution of conformists (the less intelligent type) and myopic best repliers (the more intelligent type) in the Hawk-Dove game. Myopic best repliers pay a cognitive cost for being the more intelligent type. At the largest time scale, I study the evolution of types between each generation based on their fitness at the equilibrium play occurring within each generation. I compute how the equilibrium play occurs in each generation using evolutionary stability. The process goes on until both systems reach stability. My results highlight three main findings. First, conformists outnumber myopic best repliers in the evolutionary stable state. Second, the fraction of hawks is always different than the one predicted by standard models. Third, conformists may play hawk or dove both when the conflict is harsh and when it is mild.
Work in Progress
Vertical product differentiation, prominence, and costly search (with Stefanie Y. Schmitt)
Information and markets (with Itzhak Rasooly)
Endogenous peer pressure discrimination (with Luca Sandrini)
An evolutionary analysis of confirmation bias (with Federico Innocenti)
Vertical product differentiation, prominence, and costly search (with Stefanie Y. Schmitt)
Information and markets (with Itzhak Rasooly)
Endogenous peer pressure discrimination (with Luca Sandrini)
An evolutionary analysis of confirmation bias (with Federico Innocenti)
Pre-Doctoral Research
Master Thesis (supervised by Prof. Ennio Bilancini): Competing Conventions with Different Configurations of Mistakes, 2017
Master Thesis (supervised by Prof. Ennio Bilancini): Competing Conventions with Different Configurations of Mistakes, 2017